By Stephen Taub
Illustrations by Jack Unruh
Paul Tudor Jones II is the quintessential swashbuckling hedge fund manager—a former cotton trader who famously parlayed a bet on the 1987 stock market crash into an empire with $20.8 billion at its peak. In recent years he's become known as much for his philanthropic efforts with New York's Robin Hood Foundation as for his trading skills.
But shortly before his heir apparent, star equities manager Jim Pallotta, left the firm at the end of 2008, Jones watched most of his portfolio freeze up following Lehman's bankruptcy filing and decided it was time to play a larger role at the firm. He quickly stemmed the losses, threw up a gate to suspend redemptions, and then created a side pocket for his illiquid holdings.
"I'm never going to let this happen to me again," Jones was heard saying at the time.
And he hasn't. Jones has restructured his firm with a more conservative bent, resulting in mediocre returns in 2009 and a loss so far this year. He now runs $11.5 billion. About $9.2 billion is in the flagship Tudor BVI, which includes two classes—trading shares for the liquid part of the portfolio and legacy shares for the side pocket, which is being unwound. Another $1.4 billion is invested with Tudor Tensor, a quant fund Jones launched five years ago, and related managed accounts, while the rest of the capital is in a handful of other more narrowly focused strategies.
Most significantly, Jones has transformed Tudor from a multistrategy fund to a macro one. Tightening risk controls, he has instituted a series of requirements designed to ensure that the flagship never comes close to being saddled with positions that can't be traded in a frightening market environment.
"He is taking the reins, restructuring, refocusing on his bread and butter," says Mark Yusko, chief executive and chief investment officer at Morgan Creek Capital Management, an investor in Tudor.
Jones, who founded his Greenwich, Conn., firm Tudor Investment Corp. in 1980—and began investing outside client capital in 1983—has been responsible for about half of the performance of the flagship ever since restructuring the fund in February 2009.
His view is increasingly cautious. Unlike many hedge fund managers who've been railing against inflation for some time, Jones is talking about deflation. In a recent letter to investors, they say, he opined that the long process of deleveraging remains the key driver of fixed-income markets and that it will be hard for the Federal Reserve Board to counter the deflationary aspects of this deleveraging. Jones is also bearish on the stock market, at least until the November elections. The legendary macro trader thinks the dollar will start to weaken later this year and that oil prices will be soft. As a result, gold continues to be Tudor's favorite commodity.
Since taking over and retooling his fund, Jones has enjoyed mixed success. Like many other macro funds, Tudor's flagship was up less than 1% in July when the S&P 500 surged about 7%, leaving it down 1.2% for the year. Last year the flagship's 15.4% return substantially lagged the S&P 500. BVI also was at the low end of the mid- to high-teens returns Jones has promised to deliver to investors over the long haul. (Since its 1986 inception, the flagship gained an annualized 21.13% through August 1.)
Now the overriding question is how long the 55-year-old Jones plans to continue spearheading the firm—and what happens when he retires. When Jones restructured the fund, he reassured investors he would stick around: "While we will have other traders who will be substantial contributors to our performance during 2009 and beyond, I hope to be in the lead or near the lead for many years to come."
Jones, whose current title is co-chairman and chief investment officer, clarified that position recently. "I have no intentions to stop trading or retire in the next five years and plan to stay engaged as CIO for years to come," he said in a statement to AR the day after the hedge fund world was rocked by the sudden retirement of 57-year-old Stanley Druckenmiller, who plans to close his Duquesne Capital Management after a bout of poor performance.
The issue is significant for Tudor as Tudor has no key man clause that would allow investors to leave should Jones depart. More important, there's no clear heir apparent now that Pallotta has gone. And even his closest friends concede that Jones—who with wife, Sonia, a former Australian fashion model, owns a 13,000-square-foot mansion in Greenwich, Conn.; a home in the Florida Keys; Tudor Farms in Cambridge, Md.; and conservation properties in Africa—has many other interests. For example, he is deeply involved in the charitable Robin Hood Foundation he co-founded in 1988.
The problems in the market that led to Tudor's eventual transformation can be traced to August 2007, as the subprime mortgage crisis began to spread. The unusual volatility led Tudor's management committee to tell a number of managers to bring down their gross exposures.
Among those receiving the order was Pallotta, who had been running Tudor's Raptor Global funds, the long/short equity operation, since 1993. At the time he was managing more than $9 billion plus an additional $1 billion to $2 billion in BVI, which came to 12% of that fund. Jones and Pallotta disagreed over Raptor's gross exposure. The conversation itself was unusual, given that Pallotta always operated with total autonomy. And when the Raptor funds finally got their grosses down to where Jones wanted, many of Raptor's positions quickly turned violently to the upside.
Unable to take advantage of the rebound, Raptor lost 7% by the end of 2007. Investors took out more than $2 billion even though Pallotta had generated better than a 16% annualized return since joining Tudor.
"It was one of those spikes in volatility and periods of extreme dislocation in the markets that caused Paul and our management committee to say everyone needs to look at their gross book and ability to manage that book," Tudor co-chairman Mark Dalton recalls.
A few months later Pallotta told Jones he wanted to leave and eventually open his own business. In August 2008, the two announced the spin-off, which was slated to happen at year-end.
Meanwhile, the global markets were becoming more volatile as the financial crisis worsened. Raptor finished 2008 down 21%, as it suffered more than $3.8 billion from redemptions, for a two-year total of nearly $6 billion. In June 2009, a few months after spinning out on his own, Pallotta shut down Raptor.
Although Pallotta and Jones had a great partnership for about 15 years, they had vastly different views of how to manage money. As long ago as 2005, Pallotta wanted to change his funds to a four-year lockup and agree not to take his performance fee until after that four-year period. The idea did not move forward too far, however.
In any case, the two men are still friends, and Pallotta still has a substantial amount of his wealth invested in Tudor. In fact, the two recently had lunch in New York. "It wasn't easy leaving," says Pallotta. "I love these guys like family. I wouldn't have had the life opportunities I have had without them."
The developments at Raptor were a harbinger of what was to come. Although Tudor BVI was up nearly 7% through June 2008, Jones had grown increasingly uncomfortable with his equity exposure and the financial markets in general. By the end of June, he saw the weekly S&P 500 stock charts starting to resemble the daily charts of the Dow Jones Industrials in 1987, when Jones established his reputation by gaining 201% after correctly predicting the market's October collapse.
By the time the markets reopened after Lehman filed for bankruptcy in mid-September 2008, Jones and the rest of the partners were stunned to learn that more than 25% of BVI's $10.5 billion portfolio had become illiquid, especially its emerging markets corporate credit portfolio, which had well more than $2 billion in assets. The group, which had made money every year since Ashwin Vasan headed up the strategy in 2002, had 60 positions in 12 countries in Asia, Latin America, the former Soviet republics and Africa. "We did not anticipate the potential of total illiquidity in the emerging market corporate credit book," Dalton concedes. Vasan resigned in 2009.
"All the partners at the firm were surprised at the extent of the emerging markets portfolio," Pallotta recalls.
As the global financial crisis unfolded and fear pervaded the markets, Jones stepped up his involvement. He immediately scrutinized BVI's various portfolios, looking at individual positions and helping to develop an exit strategy for many of them. He made sure he was more regularly briefed by his investment team, risk managers and portfolio oversight group. And he quickly raised cash where he could, to about 70% by the end of October from 50% earlier in the year. This helped mitigate the damage, and BVI finished the year down just 4.86%, the first and only losing year in its 24-year history.
In a letter to investors dated November 28, 2008, Jones indicated that macro and quant trading had saved the day. Jones and other macro traders gained 25% or more; the quant book rose 30%. Those gains helped offset the losses in credit, fixed-income arbitrage and other more fundamentally oriented strategies.
Tudor's 2008 performance cemented Jones's reputation as one of the greatest traders of all time, given that many other legends were nursing losses in the double digits. His skills were highlighted when Jones's oldest fund—Tudor Futures Fund—a $400 million separate fund he runs in parallel with his portion of BVI, wound up finishing the year up just over 23%. That fund, which largely represents money from family and friends, has never had a loss and has compounded at 27.2% through July 2010 since its founding in September 1984.
But Tudor's mild losses didn't keep investors from wanting out. Investors representing about 14% of BVI's assets requested to exit at year-end. Some of them were simply looking to raise cash. So, like many other investors, Jones—who allowed quarterly redemptions with 60 days' notice—had to decide whether to meet those requests.
Jones did what many of his peers did—he took the controversial step of suspending redemptions while he sought approval from investors for a major restructuring of the main fund. Tudor decided to break BVI into two parts. BVI trading shares, which contained the fund's liquid portfolio and would continue operating as usual, would have $7.2 billion. The other $2.8 billion—$1.7 billion in illiquid investments and $1.1 billion in cash needed for collateral calls—was put into a legacy side pocket, with the goal of eventually liquidating the portfolio.
"A lesson of 2008 is that we all need to think clearly about the objectives of investor capital and the structure of our funds," Dalton explains. "We don't want to intentionally do something illiquid if we have quarterly redemptions."
When in early 2009 Jones opened BVI to new investors for the first time in many years, he made it clear that liquidity would be the cornerstone of the firm's overall strategy. Tudor pulled in about $2 billion before Jones shut it down again. Tudor continues to raise capital for Tensor.
"He did not blow up investors or his business," says Ernest Kuehne III, founder of Double Eagle Capital Management, a fund of funds that has been invested with BVI for two years. "When the markets are hairy and there are political headwinds, I know he is not going to take unnecessary risk and he will protect my capital."
JONES is most comfortable trading frequently in liquid markets. To understand why he's so cautious now, it helps to recognize that he likes to ride big market moves like a momentum trader or trend follower. Today's uncertainty means such trends are in short supply.
Jones is looking for the catalyst that will touch off a major market move—what he might call a life-changing event. His skill is as much betting how other traders will react to critical events as being able to predict the future movement of a specific market.
The distinguishing characteristic in macro is that "you have to be a tape reader, which is somewhat of a lost art form," he said in an interview with AR months before the crash of 2008. (He declined to be interviewed for this article.) "The inability to read a tape and spot trends is also why so many in the relative-value space who rely solely on fundamentals have been annihilated in the past decade."
The famous macro traders came of age trading volatile commodities in the 1970s, when information was not available instantly to everyone as it is now. Today's younger generation tries to understand and rationalize more why something should go up or why something should go down, Jones said. "As a result, technical analysis is at the bottom of the study list for many of the younger generation, particularly since the skill often requires them to close their eyes and trust the price action," he elaborated. "The pain of gain is just too overwhelming for all of us to bear."
Memphis-born Jones graduated in 1976 with a BA in economics from the University of Virginia, where he won an intramural welterweight boxing championship. Over the past decade the hedge fund manager has donated $35 million toward the construction of the university's new 16,000-seat basketball home, named the John Paul Jones Arena after his father, an attorney who graduated from UVA law school in 1948.
After he finished his degree, the younger Jones spent several years as a clerk on the trading floor and as a broker for E.F. Hutton, where at 25 he became the firm's youngest vice president. He then fatefully went to work for two years as an apprentice to legendary New Orleans cotton broker Eli Tullis after an introduction from Jones's cousin, the legendary cotton merchant William Dunavant Jr. Jones's grandfather was also a cotton merchant.
Jones says Tullis had the biggest influence on his life. "He was a magnificent trader," Jones recalled in the 2008 interview. "In my twenties I got to watch his financial ups and downs and how he dealt with it. His fortitude and temperament in the face of adversity were great examples of how to remain cool under fire. I'll never forget the day the New Orleans Junior League Board came to visit him during lunch. He was getting absolutely massacred in the cotton market that day, but he charmed those little old ladies like he was a movie star. It put everything in perspective for me."
Jones went on to spend more than two years on the New York Cotton Exchange. Then in 1983—at the age of 29—Jones started managing client capital in his own macro trading firm, Tudor Investment Corp., partly with $35,000 from the famed Commodities Corp., and launched the Tudor Futures Fund the following year. He instantly enjoyed astounding success on his own in his first two full years: 111% in 1985 and 98.4% in 1986. In 1986 he launched Tudor BVI as an offshore version of the futures fund.
WHEN Jones reopened his flagship fund to new investors in early 2009, he made it clear to prospective investors that the fund had redefined itself from a multistrategy to a macro fund with many traders. The focus now is trading currencies, fixed income, commodities and equities—with the ability to liquidate the portfolio rapidly in the event of a severe market dislocation.
A Tudor trader must be able to sell 80% of his portfolio within two business days during which the markets are open and the remaining 20% within an additional one to two business days. "We are back to our original roots with an absolute return trading orientation in deep and liquid markets," Jones told investors in a letter dated February 24, 2009. "Our strategy emphasizes liquidity and the ability to exit quickly and efficiently when warranted."
From January 1, 2008, to February 1, 2009, Tudor BVI shrank about 25% to 39 traders or trader groups. Of those, 34 capital allocations are made to individual Tudor traders, and the other five capital allocations to outside managers. By comparison, Tudor BVI opened 2008 with 52 traders or trader groups.
And Jones became the dominant portfolio manager, controlling between one-quarter and one-half of assets. The goal is for Jones "to have a substantial impact on the performance," he told investors.
Today Tudor has allocated 85% of assets to directional macro strategies, compared with 53% in January 2008. At the same time, it narrowed the list of other strategies in which it will trade to discretionary long/short equity (in London and Singapore) and systematic equity market neutral, and only 15% of capital versus 35% at the start of 2008. Jones also eliminated his "other strategies" allocation, either by exiting those strategies or designating them to the legacy side pocket. They include emerging market corporate credit, private equity and mortgages.
"He wanted to emphasize tactical trading strategies over long-term investing," says Ken Tropin, founder of Graham Capital Management, a $6.3 billion hedge fund firm that was seeded in part by Tudor.
As Jones put it, "We have aligned the fund's liquidity and duration with its 60-day redemption period." Jones also set tighter risk parameters. With the exception of those at its quant fund, Tudor's traders were required to abide by a mandated "time-out" if at any point in the year their losses amount to more than 5% of their original capital. If a trader exceeds his drawdown, he must liquidate his portfolio and not trade until he reassesses his strategy and risk parameters. This was a reduction from Tudor's historical time-out requirement of 10%. He has since adjusted that parameter to 7.5%. Tudor's traders operate at 2 to 2.5 times leverage.
Tudor also reduced the absolute loss-limit on BVI traders to 15% of "capital at risk," down from the historic 25% limit. Jones added he will permit more risk if either BVI trading shares in aggregate are up 5% net on the year or any trader, individually, has a 3% gross gain. "In brief, we encourage an increase in exposure once a trader or BVI Trading Shares have established a profit reservoir," Jones said. "This program embodies the classic 'make it and take it' style that has been the foundation of my personal trading for over 30 years and that I believe is the winning formula for any long-term successful operator in global financial markets."
At the time of the letter, Jones said he expected to manage $6 billion in BVI to his targeted annual net return of 20% or above for 2009—a target he missed. In addition, the fund's assets were roughly $5.8 billion at the time, excluding the liquidating share class.
In 2009, Tudor slightly trailed several other macro managers, including Brevan Howard Asset Management, which was up 18%; Moore Global Investments, up 21%, and Moore Macro Managers, which gained 16%.
Many of Jones's investors don't seem too upset. "I look at the fact that over 2008 and 2009, my NAV is positive," says Kuehne. "For the last 36 months, the environment has been to preserve capital."
Not all investors agree, however. Tudor's ranking on AR's annual Hedge Fund Report Card fell dramatically after last year's performance. Tudor now ranks 22nd, down from second in 2009. (See "Hedge Fund Report Card.")
Last year, Jones's discretionary macro strategy accounted for the biggest portion of his gains. In the first few months, he was long the dollar, fixed income and gold, and he shorted the S&P futures. As the markets bottomed in March, he reversed course with his S&P futures position and rode the rising commodities markets.
Jones called last year's market move a bear market rally in August, switching gears only in October. He then acknowledged that the forceful policy response to avert depression tail risks posed by the financial crisis had likely unleashed a wave of liquidity which is probably greater than that of 2001-2003.
In the October 2009 letter to clients, Jones predicted that global growth would be strong through at least the first half of 2010, driven by a monetary and fiscal impulse, by a reduction of inventory destocking and by a weak dollar.
In large part, he was wrong. And sure enough, in the spring he scaled back that view. And so this year BVI was down less than 1% through July, picking up gains from currencies and playing long-term rates.
Meanwhile, the side pocket recovered along with emerging markets credit and distressed markets. In 2009 Legacy was up 12.8% and climbed another 10.2% in the first seven months of this year. Since inception, it is up 24.75% through July 31 and has made regular quarterly distributions. Through June 30, 60% of its original capital had been returned to investors, who have a right to roll the distribution into BVI, which 60% to 65% have elected to do.
This year Tudor's quant fund, Tensor, has lagged and was down more than 6% through July. So far this is Tensor's worst year. Led by UK-born Steve Evans, who joined in 1997 from D. E. Shaw, Tensor was up 6.4% in 2007—when many quants flailed—and more than 35% in 2008. Last year it lost 2.7%.
Jones's obsession with controlling risk, trading in liquid markets and not losing money is forcing investors to lower their expectations. They have to accept that Jones will never be up 100% in a single year again as in the early days, consoled that he won't be down 25% either. With fees of 4% and 23%, that may seem like a lot to swallow. But to many institutional investors, that's just fine.
"Clients these days don't want you to take risk with their capital," explains Glenn Dubin, chief executive of Highbridge Capital Management and a longtime friend of Jones. "Great pools of wealth—sovereign wealth funds, ultrawealthy family offices—don't need to see 30% returns every year. In the case of Tudor, they want to know their capital is safe and that the steward of their capital is one of the greatest traders of all times." About two-thirds of Tudor's assets are invested by institutions—pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and foundations, as well as some wealthy families.
"That's his real genius that people don't get," says Yusko. "He's not looking to make money in one month or one quarter. He is looking to compound wealth for decades."
Or at the very least, hold on to what he's got. Partners' capital, of which Jones is a majority owner, accounts for about one-third of BVI's capital. There are 25 active partners in the firm.
THE evolution of Tudor mirrors the changing face of the hedge fund industry. From 1986 through 1994, the firm was identified with Jones, who was the sole "risk-taker," as the firm likes to call those who manage individual strategies. But in the early 1990s, the company began to expand its scope.
By far the biggest change came in 1993, when Jones hired Pallotta to spearhead the expansion to U.S. long/short equities, creating the Raptor funds and turning BVI into a multistrategy, multitrader firm. The Boston native had made a name for himself running a hedge fund for Essex Capital. Pallotta did not want to leave his close-knit family for Greenwich, so Jones allowed him to open an office in Boston.
Today Tudor has 28 risk-takers, but only 15 people—including Jones—control 80% of BVI's assets. Of the 15, 11 are discretionary global macro traders, three are equity traders and the remaining trader group is systems, which includes quant macro and quant equities.
With Pallotta's departure, there is no U.S. long/short discretionary equity portfolio manager; equity is invested by systems traders and macro traders. The recent departure of Jeffrey Silverman, the head of recruiting, to Perella Weinberg Partners, has raised questions about Tudor's commitment to hiring now that macro investing is playing such a dominant role. This may change soon, as the firm expects to hire two U.S. equity sector specialists. Tudor says that collectively the new equity traders will be managing about 7% of the flagship fund by year-end. The firm also insists recruiting is still very active, although in a strategic, highly selective manner. These days Tudor's recruiting effort is led by vice chairman John Macfarlane and Gavin Boyle, chief executive of the London and Asia offices. Tudor says it hopes to take advantage of the expected downsizing of the proprietary trading desks at many of the major investment banking firms as a result of financial reform legislation that will force banks to get out of such trading.
In 1995 Tudor also created a management committee, the firm's senior decision-making body. Members include Jones, Dalton, Evans, Macfarlane, Boyle, chief operating officer Mike Riccardi, chief financial officer John Torell, general counsel Andrew Paul and Singapore-based portfolio manager Andrew McMillan.
Another group, the capital allocation committee, determines the firm's broad exposures to discretionary macro, quantitative macro, discretionary equities and quantitative equities. The committee includes 11 people, only nine of whom are permitted to vote—traders, risk managers and a portfolio oversight manager. The group makes capital allocation decisions for BVI at least four times each year.
For the past six years, Tudor also has had a strategy committee that guides the direction of the firm. Thirteen people from research, trading and management meet three times each year. The committee decides, for example, whether the firm should grow by launching a new fund or building an area of expertise.
Since the restructuring, Tudor has abandoned several new ventures. Earlier this year Tudor spun off $650 million Stone Lion Capital Partners, a distressed-debt fund that was launched in the spring of 2008 by former Bear Stearns proprietary traders Gregory Hanley and Alan Mintz, former senior managing directors and co-heads of Bear Stearns's distressed-debt group. (Tudor says the plan from the outset was to build it to be eventually spun out with Tudor being a strategic partner.)
And late last year Tudor shut down Singapore-based Tudor Global Emerging Markets Fund because the managers—who still invest on behalf of BVI and actually made money in 2008—prefer to invest based on absolute rather than relative performance.
THE big question being asked these days is about Jones's future. Given his involvement in philanthropy, his age and the difficult market conditions, some think Jones wants to retire or dial back, if not immediately, then in five years. But insiders and friends insist Jones has no timeline for retiring, stressing he won't pull a Bill Gates and leave completely to devote all his time to philanthropy without phasing out. "What Paul has built is a sustainable institution," Dubin insists, pointing to the infrastructure, technology and Tudor brand.
This is a big obsession for the aging billionaire hedge fund crowd, one made more topical by Druckenmiller's recent retirement decision. Investors are also mindful that earlier luminaries Michael Steinhardt, Julian Robertson, Leon Levy and Jack Nash failed to create firms that outlived them when they retired.
So far, Highbridge, which was bought by JPMorgan Chase in two stages, is the only firm that has truly made the transition. However, its situation is vastly different from Tudor's. Co-founder Dubin is still running Highbridge's operations, and unlike Jones, he and co-founder Henry Swieca never pulled the trigger on investments on a day-to-day basis.
An interesting parallel is George Soros. Though much older than Jones, Soros is a similar macro trading legend, and he came back from retirement to run his Quantum Endowment Fund in 2007 when markets got scary. He's since turned the reins back over to his chief investment officer, Keith Anderson, and has gone back to his political and philosophical pursuits.
Will Jones want to do the same once Tudor is firmly back on track? The concern is that there is no other person who is the face of the firm and the apparent successor.
Dalton is four years older than Jones—and he is not a trader. Evans is barely known outside the firm and runs a niche strategy. The 52-year-old Pallotta could have played the role, but he is gone. And while investors aren't protected by a key man clause, which would allow them to exit if the fund manager retires, a 60-day redemption notice does not hold investors very long.
For these reasons, Tudor officials go out of their way to stress that no changes are planned in the near future. "Neither Paul nor I in the next five years plan to go anywhere," Dalton says. He also plays up the fact that the firm currently has 25 active partners and has a deep management infrastructure, including a vice chairman, chief financial officer, chief investment officer and a general counsel.
"He is the hardest-working guy in the business," insists Tropin. "I see no evidence of him reducing the pace."
An avid conservationist, Jones presently serves on the board and is a former chairman of the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. He is also a director of the Everglades Foundation and for a fund-raiser lent his decoy collection to Ducks Unlimited, which advocates wetlands and waterfowl conservation.
Jones is a supporter of inner-city schools and an advocate of charter schools. He is a member of the board of directors of the Excellence Boys Charter School, the country's first all-boys charter school, located in the depressed Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York.
Outside the hedge fund, Jones is probably most known for the Robin Hood Foundation, which he created with Dubin and Peter Borish in 1988. The charitable group, whose operating expenses are paid by its board of directors, seeks to boost the quality of life of New York City's poor neighborhoods in a variety of ways. Last year alone it reached its 2009 fundraising goal of $148.8 million and invested more than $130 million in more than 200 schools and programs, including charter schools, homeless shelters and teacher training. It claims to have kept more than 4,000 families from being homeless. In June 2008 two public noncharter schools funded by Robin Hood, the Urban Assembly School for Law and Justice and the Bronx Lab School, celebrated their first class of high school graduates. Today 85% of those graduates are enrolled in college.
Can all of these other initiatives distract Jones or cause him to lose a little interest in Tudor as he gets older? Possibly. But even those who tacitly acknowledge that Jones won't be running the firm for the next 20 years stress that his role will probably evolve. Whether investors will stick around may depend on how well Jones can protect—and grow—their capital in the meantime.
FACT FILE: TUDOR INVESTMENT CORP.
Assets under management: $11.5 billion (August 1, 2010)
Flagship: Tudor BVI
Performance: 21.13% annualized since July 31, 1986
Founded:1980
Offices: Greenwich, London, Singapore, Surrey, Sydney, Boston
Founder: Paul Tudor Jones II